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Abstract 
In Africa, traditional conflict resolution is based on values, norms, cultures and 
beliefs as practiced by the members of the community. Thus, traditional conflict 
resolution decisions are readily accepted by the community. However, colonialism 
had very serious impact on African values, norms, cultures and beliefs. It 
disregarded, undermined and weakened them. Cultural hegemony (as a result of 
colonialism) and legal transplantation (without adequate attention to traditional 
systems) have adversely affected traditional conflict resolution in Africa. 
Nonetheless, the continuous use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms across 
African communities clearly demonstrates that they still have a role to play. The 
article aims to assess the institution of traditional conflict resolution in Africa with 
particular emphasis on South Africa and Ethiopia. Both countries are multiethnic 
societies with a variety of cultures, languages and religions. Ethiopia maintained its 
freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation 
and from 1936 to 1941. South Africa was a Dutch colony from 1662 to 1815, a 
British colony from1910 to 1948 and under the Apartheid era from 1948 to1994. 
Using case studies of South Africa and Ethiopia, the article examines some of the 
successes and challenges faced by traditional conflict resolution institutions.  The 
opportunities offered to them by the two legal systems are also examined. The two 
systems are not selected for the purpose of comparative analysis compared, but are 
examined as self representative examples in their own historical, political and legal 
contexts.   
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In actual life, no society is immune from conflict due to differences in interests, 
goals, values and aims among people.1 Conflicts occur within families, clans, 
villages or other small units.2 Most African communities have their own 
traditional conflict resolution processes that enable them to prevent, manage and 
resolve conflict. Most African States are moving towards incorporating 
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in their policies, laws and 
constitutions. Even in countries where there is no formal state recognition, it has 
remained resilient and continues to exist outside the areas of state influence.3 
Thus, traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are crucial institutions for 
conflict resolution in Africa.  
Many African states (South Africa and Ethiopia included) are grappling with 
conflict resolution. However, the institutions in African states are not able to 
cope with the huge demands unleashed by everyday conflict. It is within this 
context that the complementarity between traditional institutions and the modern 
state becomes not only apparent but also imperative. The continuing role and 
influence of traditional leadership in modern Africa is hard to miss.4  
Even though the relationship between the state (formal) and traditional 
(informal) institutions is a contested terrain loaded with complexities, the unique 
features of traditional institutions, due to their endogeneity and use of local 
actors, enable them to either resist or even sometimes challenge the state. 
Traditional institutions continue to demonstrate their relevance in post-conflict 
states. This is especially true in the context of weak states that are overwhelmed 
with ongoing state-building processes. Though there is no clear-cut formula as 
to the interactions between traditional and state institutions, a relationship exists 
which is central in the promotion of sustainable peace in post-conflict Africa.5  
In this article it is argued that not all traditional dispute resolution institutions 
are worthy of legal recognition, nor are traditional institutions immune from 
weaknesses. It is argued that there is a strong case for acknowledging the value 
of certain traditional institutions, and the rights of people to make use of them in 
legally recognized ways. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms can 
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contribute through partnership and collaboration with the formal system to 
provide culturally acceptable and meaningful justice. What is more, using case 
studies of South Africa and Ethiopia, the article examines some of the successes 
and challenges faced by traditional conflict resolution institutions; and 
opportunities offered to them by the two legal systems respectively. It does not 
aim to compare the two legal systems. They are simply mentioned as 
representative examples in their own context, although the article could serve as 
a basis for future comparative analysis.   
The first section of this article deals with an overview on the history, 
philosophy and methods of African traditional dispute resolution. Sections 2 and 
3 respectively discuss the traditional conflict resolution in South Africa and 
Ethiopia, followed by a conclusion.  
1. History, Philosophy and Methods of African Traditional 
Dispute Resolution: Overview  
Prior to colonialism, “many African societies have had their own traditional 
approaches and methods of conflict prevention, management and resolution.”6 
These approaches and methods “were (and still are) deeply embedded in the 
people‟s cosmology and culture.”7 Prior to colonialism, “African traditional 
religions and Islam largely shaped the culture, world-view and civilization of 
various parts of the continent.”8 Of course, it is good to note that “the orthodox 
Christian tradition existed in Egypt and also to a larger extent, Ethiopia.”9 
Similarly, “the early conquest and settlement of Dutch merchants in the coastal 
region of South Africa prior to late-nineteenth-century colonialism led to the 
establishment of the Dutch Reform Christian church in this part of Africa.”10 
The incorporation of Africa into the global system through western 
colonialism has had extensive effects on the nature of conflicts and the 
traditional approach and methods of conflict resolution. As Almod and Powell 
observe, “the traditional African approach has been significantly affected, while 
some of the related methods have been displaced or significantly transformed by 
the countervailing imperatives of western civilization and its concomitants of 
multifaceted liberalism and cultural secularization.”11 
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Considering the serious impact of western cultural influence on African 
states and societies, Kenneth C. Omeje observes that “many scholars contest the 
relevance and place of traditional conflict resolution in Africa. Especially by 
highlighting the complexity of modern social structures and the conflicts they 
generate in Africa.” He further observes that “other scholars also argue that 
traditional approaches and methods of conflict resolution should be confined to 
local communities while the modern western alternatives should be applied to 
the cities, formal-sector institutions and state systems.” However, he contends 
that “such a categorical distinction seems both conceptually and empirically 
problematic because of the immense diversity and overlapping dynamics of the 
African heritage.”12 
Post-colonial Africa combines and exhibits a diversified cultural, religious, 
traditional practices that survived the attack of colonialism and westernization. 
Accordingly, the African cultures that support the traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms are vastly heterogeneous and dynamic. However, it is good to note 
that there are still a wide range of cross-cutting and overlapping tendencies and 
practices across a large number of communities and regions. 
In Africa, the philosophy in conflict resolution is community oriented. For 
example, the concept of Ubuntu is a humanistic philosophy and it implies 
„collective personhood‟, and is best captured by the Zulu maxims: „a person is a 
person through other persons‟; „my humanity is inextricably tied to your 
humanity‟;13 and „a person is a person because of another person‟. It is “an all-
embracing, multidimensional philosophy that invokes the idiom and images of 
group cooperation, generosity, tolerance, respect, sharing, solidarity, forgiveness 
and conciliation.”14 Unlike the western values which predominantly 
individualistic.   
Ubuntu combines traditional conflict prevention and peace-building concept. 
It “embraces the notion of acknowledgement of guilt, showing of remorse and 
repentance by perpetrators of injustice, asking for and receiving forgiveness, and 
paying compensation or reparation as a prelude for reconciliation and peaceful 
coexistence.”15 Beyond the process of conflict resolution, Ubuntu expresses the 
African philosophy of „humanness‟ and it is a notion that has cultural 
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significance in diverse African societies, though the concept is widespread in 
southern, central and eastern Africa.16 
It is also good to note that the transitional justice system implemented in 
post-apartheid South Africa, i.e., “the restorative justice-oriented „Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission‟, subsequently adopted in varying degrees by 
different post-war and deeply divided African societies (e.g. Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Burundi), was philosophically informed by the Ubuntu 
tradition”.17 Similarly, the Gacaca transitional justice system enunciated in post-
genocide Rwanda, which “combines both punitive and restorative justice and 
African customary and Western civil laws, is in concept an expression of 
Ubuntu”.18  
Thus, “it is within the philosophical context of Ubuntu and comparable 
practices in other parts of Africa that traditional African methods of conflict 
resolution are essentially situated.”19 With regard to traditional dispute 
resolution methods, it is relevant to mention that “negotiation, mediation, 
adjudication and reconciliation have, since pre-colonial history, been developed 
to different levels and practiced in various African communities”20 This implies 
that it would be wrong to consider negotiation, mediation, adjudication and 
reconciliation to have solely a western origin. In this regard, section 2.2 of this 
article highlights the application of negotiation and mediation in traditional 
dispute resolution in south Africa before a case is referred to the traditional 
leaders for adjudication.  
In many African communities, “the practices usually involve the intervention 
of reputable elders, either on their own initiative or by the invitation of a 
concerned third party or the disputant(s).”21 The method “is highly context 
specific and disputants are expected to honour the outcomes and decisions, 
which could be more or less binding, depending on the power relations at play 
and the customs of the community.”22 In Africa, “there are also semi-formal and 
more formal litigations in which one party could sue another in a royal or 
customary court; as the case may be”23 In this case, “adjudication is handled by 
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a presiding traditional ruler with or without the support of legal counselors”.24 
However, it is good to stress that “under most African traditions elders are 
respected as the communities‟ repository of functional wisdom and experience 
and therefore assigned a prime place in community leadership and dispute 
settlement”25 This traditional philosophy, Kenneth C. Omeje observes is “the 
logic behind the creation of the African Union Panel of the Wise, comprising a 
team of five to seven highly distinguished African personalities constituted to 
support the conflict intervention efforts of the regional body through preventive 
diplomacy and peacemaking.”26 
However, it must be underlined that traditional African approaches and 
methods of conflict resolution are not spared from criticism. They have often 
been criticized for being arbitrary and disproportionate in passing sanctions.27 It 
is also argued that customary institutions that represent dominant interests may 
pass judgments that are against the interests of vulnerable groups like women, 
children and minorities.28 Nevertheless, in general, traditional dispute resolution 
approaches and methods play significant role in conflict management and 
resolution.29  
Currently, many African countries such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Ghana, 
Namibia and Uganda have dealt with the question of integrating traditional 
conflict resolution mechanisms into their post-independence governance 
systems. Likewise, the South African White Paper on Traditional Leadership 
which takes a favourable view of the Ghanaian model, that “recognizes the 
institution of traditional leadership and provides for the establishment of 
national and regional houses of traditional leadership;” but states that while 
“traditional leaders have a role to play in issues of development … they are 
forbidden from active participation in party politics.”30  
In Ethiopia, the 1995 Constitution (Article 34(5)) recognizes limited 
application of traditional law, and encourages people to use customary and 
religious laws for marital, personal and family rights.31 Article 78(5) of the 
Constitution also states that:  
Pursuant to sub-Article 5 of Article 34(5), the House of Peoples‟ 
Representatives and State Councils can establish or give official recognition 
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to religious and customary courts. Religious and customary courts that had 
state recognition and functioned prior to the adoption of the Constitution 
shall be organized on the basis of recognition accorded to them by this 
Constitution.32  
2. Traditional Conflict Resolution in South Africa 
South Africa‟s legal system is pluralistic. It consists of a number of separate 
legal traditions: transplanted European laws (Roman-Dutch law at the core, later 
influenced by English common law), collectively known as the common law, 
along with traditional laws, referred to as African customary law.  
Section 211 (2) (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
observes, a system of customary law to function with limitations and to be 
applied subject to the Constitution and any legislation that deals with customary 
law.33 Section 212(1) (2) (a) (b) further highlights the role of traditional leaders 
as a means through which these customary practices may be effected on matters 
affecting local communities and stresses the significance of the establishment of 
the house and council of traditional leaders through provincial and national 
legislation.34  In theory, the Constitution in Section 211 (3) puts customary law 
on the same footing as the Roman Dutch Law. However, in practice, cases 
involving customary law are often dragged and/or approached from a non-
customary legal stance with devastating consequences for both parties.35 
The unique blend of Western and African laws is also detectable in South 
Africa‟s national justice system, which is comprised of a justice system based 
on western values and principles of justice on the one hand and, on the other, a 
traditional system based on African values and principles. The main goals of 
African justice have been described as the “search for truth, reconciliation, 
compensation and rehabilitation” while the goals of Western justice are seen as 
“procedural justice, retribution, incarceration, and revenge.”36 In spite of the 
existence of fundamental differences between these two systems arising from 
their dissimilar values and principles, legal developments over the years 
inevitably led to cross-pollination and the formation of loose ties between the 
two systems.  
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The Constitution makes express provision for the retention of the roughly 
1,500 traditional courts in operation in South Africa.37 Due to the fact that they 
differ quite considerably from community to community, it is difficult to 
generalize about their exact nature and structure.38 Furthermore, at different 
levels, disputes are evident when the values and interests of communities are 
challenged or unmet. Security (preservation of culture, language, etc.) and 
(local) development are often at the forefront of disputes and this is driven by 
political pulls that disregard the values and practices of communities. The 
obvious focus of the pre-colonial era was mainly to civilize the indigenous 
population and to get rid of their customary practices.  
This „civilizing mission‟ mindset has also been reflected in the government‟s 
attempt to introduce Traditional Courts Bill which was not a success story. The 
Traditional Court Bill has been in making for many years and it seeks to 
establish constitutional role for traditional leaders. The bill was tabled for the 
first time in 2008 and it caused tremendous public outcry from rural people, 
scholars and civil societies. The most serious criticisms raised on the bill from 
the very beginning were the failure to consult the ordinary rural people and 
issues regarding the bill‟s constitutionality. The bill was criticized that it 
consulted only traditional leaders and members of local government. It was also 
criticized for been against the principle of equality as enshrined in the 
constitution, specially, the equality right of women. The problems continued 
when the same bill was reintroduced in 2012. Accordingly, the bill lapsed in 
2014. In 2017 again a new bill was introduced with the need to eliminate 
discrimination of all kinds in traditional courts. But as Sindiso Minisi Weeks 
observed, the new bill has ambiguity because “on the one hand it says that 
traditional courts must operate according to customary law and customs” while 
on the other hand “it describes them as „courts of law‟ allowing them to develop 
the common law”.39       
Currently, the most contentious issue obstructing the passing of Traditional 
Courts Bill is the opt-out clause which gives residents in traditional areas 
(expected to be more that seventeen million) the right not to subject themselves 
to traditional courts. As things stand now, it appears that the bill will not make it 
into the statute books. Even if it happens that in the future the bill would be 
passed by a majority vote in the Parliament, it would definitely land in the 
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Constitutional Court. Thus, the fate of the Traditional Courts Bill is not decided 
yet.     
The legal system in South Africa allows customary law –which is based on 
existing customs and practices of the communities– to be employed in 
traditional courts. However, it is good to note that there is no legal 
representation or formal recording of the traditional court proceedings. Rather, 
the proceedings follow the customs and practices of a particular ethnic group. 
The goal of the traditional courts is to restore social cohesion. The main actors 
in the tradition conflict resolution system are often elders of the community.  
2.1 Traditional Conflict Resolution in Historical Context  
In South Africa, prior to colonialism, dispute resolution was governed by 
customs and practices of different communities. After colonialism, the Black 
Administration Act40 was introduced. The Act allows civil and criminal powers 
to be vested in traditional leaders.   
However, the act required that “the traditional leader must have the 
Minister‟s authorization to resolve civil disputes; the claim must be based on 
customary law; the race of the parties must be African; and the parties or the 
defendant must be residents within the traditional leader‟s area of jurisdiction 
(…)”.41 Some of the civil disputes heard by traditional leaders are “return of 
dowry (lobolo) or damages for adultery. A traditional leader can, however not 
determine divorce, nullity or separation matters”.42  
The crimes to be handled by the traditional leaders included common law, 
statutory and customary law.43 Crimes for which the traditional leaders have no 
jurisdiction are listed in the Third Schedule to the Act.44 Traditional leaders 
“may impose any punishment under customary law except fines exceeding 
R100, death, imprisonment or corporal punishment”.45 They can also report a 
defaulter to a magistrate within 48 hours and the magistrate will order the 
defaulter to comply (…)”.46 As per Section 20 (8) of the Act, “a person 
aggrieved by the decision of the traditional leader may appeal to a magistrate”.47 
The Black Administration Act had a devastating impact on customary 
practices, among others; it was instituted as a tool of control people who were 
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already confined to their homesteads.48 With regard to the erosion of the 
legitimacy of the traditions and customary laws, Yoichi Mine observed that 
during the time of white rulers, ethnic traditions and customary laws were 
preserved, but the collusion of autocratic traditional leaders with the white 
government constantly eroded their legitimacy.49 He exemplified his allegation 
by mentioning the case of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the founder of a Zulu 
nationalist movement, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).50  
2.2 Traditional Conflict Resolution in Post-Apartheid South Africa  
In Post-Apartheid South Africa, a new Constitution was promulgated. As Prince 
Mashele observed, “there was considerable pressure for the abolition of 
traditional leadership, yet there were those who cautioned against the exclusion 
of traditional leaders from modern systems of governance.”51 However, the view 
that cautioned against the exclusion found considerable support in African 
National Congress (ANC) circles, although the need to align traditional 
leadership with democratic principles was emphasized.52 This approach was to 
take root in the post-apartheid constitutional framework.53  
According to Paula Jackson et al, “although the institution of traditional 
leadership continued to exist under apartheid, the impetus for formally 
recognizing the role and legitimacy of traditional leaders in a democratic system 
of government is the acknowledgment that the institution was significantly 
undermined and manipulated by previous colonial and apartheid 
administrations.”54 To this end, “the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa set the tone for recognizing traditional leaders in a democratic 
dispensation”.55 The Constitution particularly Section 211 (1), provides for the 
recognition of the “status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
customary law, subject to the Constitution”, while Section 212 (2) (a) of the 
Constitution provides for the creation of houses of traditional leaders at both 
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national and provincial levels, their role being merely to advise on matters 
relevant to tradition and customary law.56 
For Prince Mashele, the restriction of traditional leadership to an advisory 
status “stands in sharp contrast to the position it enjoyed under the homeland 
system, where chiefs exercised legislative as well as administrative authority”.57 
The current constitutional system has therefore altered the power relations 
between politicians and traditional leaders in favour of the former. Bennett also 
notes that:  
... [members of] the new (house of traditional leaders) have only limited 
powers. They may propose legislation; they cannot generate statutes of their 
own accord. They may advise and they may insist on being consulted about 
bills concerning customary laws, but they can do no more than delay the 
passing of an act.58 
Subsequent pieces of legislation have been also enacted by the post-apartheid 
government. These significantly, include the National House of Traditional 
Leaders Act59, the Municipal Structures Act60, the White Paper on Traditional 
Leadership and Governance61 and the Communal Land Rights Act62, as well as a 
number of provincial statutes.  
The National House of Traditional Leaders Act Provides for the formation of 
the National House of Traditional Leaders, whose function is to “promote the 
role of traditional leadership within a democratic constitutional dispensation.” 
The Municipal Structures deal largely with the categorisation of municipalities. 
However, it cursorily touches on issues related to the interaction between 
elected local government structures and traditional leadership. It provides that “ 
... traditional authorities that traditionally observe a system of customary law in 
the area of a municipality may participate through their leaders ... in the 
proceedings of a municipality ...”.  
This provision seems to open doors for traditional leaders to influence issues 
at local government level through municipal structures. With regard to 
participation “... the traditional leader ... may, subject to the rules and orders of 
the municipality ... participate in any debate on a matter if she/he is a councillor. 
This would include the right to submit motions, make proposals and ask 
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questions”. Prince Mashele contends that, the participation does not address the 
concerns of traditional leaders as it denies them voting powers and also 
representation is limited to less than 10%.63 However, though not sufficient, one 
cannot fail to appreciate the move taken by the South African government to 
involve traditional leaders in the local governance system.   
The functions of Traditional Councils are stated in Section 4 of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act64. According to 
Subsection (1) of Section 4, they are: 
- “[a]administering the affairs of the traditional community in accordance 
with customs and tradition”, (Subsection 1(a)) 
- “supporting municipalities in the identification of community needs” 
(Subsection 1(c)), and  
- “promoting the ideals of co-operative governance, integrated 
development planning, sustainable development and service delivery” 
(Subsection 1(h)). 
However, in spite of the recognition of the judicial powers of traditional 
leaders by the law, there are unofficial dispute resolution mechanisms. The first 
level of unofficial dispute resolution mechanism is usually the family council 
and if the dispute is not resolved, the matter is heard at the ward level by ward 
leaders and their advisers. The methods of dispute resolution at these levels are 
negotiation and mediation. If the matter is not resolved at these levels, it 
proceeds for resolution by traditional leaders recognized by law. In this regard, 
it would be proper to mention briefly the case of lekgotla (traditional council) in 
the North West Province of South Africa in the village of Makapanstad in order 
to highlight the issue at hand.  
Lekgotla is an indigenous mechanism of resolving disputes. As part of 
customary law, it protects a person‟s culture and cultural practices. Lekgotla 
strives to promote social units and social restoration. In a narrow sense, the term 
Lekgotla is defined as the council of the people. Broadly, Lekgotla is referred to 
as a cultural group of people who are at the forefront of dispute resolution under 
the traditional authority of a King or Queen in a designated area and as 
recognized by their communities.65 Lekgotla involves a process of sustained 
dialogue where people regularly keep coming back to the table to talk and listen 
to each other deeply enough about their perceptions, the conflict, and to explore 
complexities in their relationship.66 In this process of dialogue, Lekgotla does 
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not view disputes or conflict as s setback but rather as an opportunity for 
dialogue, resolution of the conflict and mutual communication between the 
parties to rebuild their relationship and reality.67 
A Kgotla is a gathering of the members of Lekgotla that draws meaning from 
the two parties involved in a dispute, conflict or crime.68 Disputes in this 
(traditional) sense are viewed from the perspective of the broken bonds between 
two families and it is therefore the responsibility of both families to engage in 
the conversation to find solutions through Lekgotla. Individuals, families and 
groups involved in disputes approach Lekgotla for sessions to negotiate, discuss 
and to resolve the disputes. It is important to note that individuals, families and 
groups will remain active in this process through Lekgotla.   
In the community of Makapanstad,69 Lekgotla revives and actualizes the 
African values, norms and beliefs of the Bakgatla Ba Mosetlha70 that were 
weakened, undermined and disregarded by colonialism and Apartheid. In 
Makapanstad, the King is regarded as the custodian of culture and tradition.71 
The elders in the community are regarded as guardians of the traditional 
knowledge of dispute resolution. Lekgotla is derived from an ideal of social 
harmony and to maintain peace and order in the community.72 The members of 
Lekgotla are entrusted with the responsibility to resolve disputes and to bring to 
life the traditions and practices of the Bakgatla.73 
Thus, as custodians of culture, traditional leaders play a prominent role in the 
affairs that affect the local communities. Not only do they preserve culture, but 











 A village in the North West province of South Africa where a system of Lekgotla is in 
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3. Traditional Conflict Resolution in Ethiopia 
The legal and judicial system in Ethiopia is “a mosaic of different systems and 
traditions”.74 It is “a civil law country but the system has also common law 
elements”.75 What is more, “Ethiopia has a mixture of modern and secular laws, 
and customary and religious rules”. All those systems “work parallel and 
sometimes even impede each other”. This is mainly “the cause for rules and 
customs whose constitutionality is arguable”. However, “discussions and 
decisions on those different systems are often avoided”.76    
Ethiopia is one typical example where colonial influence had little impact on 
the construction of its legal tradition. Since its ancient statehood, Ethiopia had 
independent but fragmented legal tradition. As Singer observes "the Italian 
occupation [1936-41], though felt in many spheres, did not contribute to the 
legal tradition”.77  He further observed that “however, Ethiopia, like all other 
African nations, does have a colonial heritage built into its legal system, albeit a 
colonialism that is somewhat removed from the usual concepts implied by that 
term". As Singer notes, in Ethiopia, “instead of domination involving a foreign 
power, control was established through internal conquest by the politically 
dominant group”.78 What is more, in Ethiopia, the marginalization of traditional 
leaders from government apparatus and the existence of a civic space dominated 
by educated westernized Ethiopians are evident.   
Although the similarity and difference between Ethiopia and other African 
countries requires further research and also depending on how one defines 
colonialism,79 monarchial Imperial Ethiopian regimes were in power for many 
centuries. Feudalism is not a case peculiar to Ethiopia but was also a chapter in 
the history of European countries in their “advance to modernity”.80 The modern 
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Ethiopian state emerged in a feudal structure that imposed the traditional 
monarchy of northern Ethiopia on much of the country. The feudal system in 
Ethiopia had a feature of exploitation which according to Markakis was “based 
on a system of accumulation that depended on coercion and closely resembled 
Western feudalism”.81 
3.1 Traditional Conflict Resolution in Historical Context 
Ethiopia has existed as “a polity, shrinking and/or expanding in shape and 
power, for more than two thousand years.”82 Its “long history of existence was 
for the most part dominated by a history of traditional mode of administration 
and social relationships.”83 Ethiopia‟s first Constitution was written in 1931 
under Emperor Haile Sellassie who reigned from 1930-1974. Before the 
enactment of this Constitution, customary law and some legal instruments used 
to govern the socio-political life of the people.  
The first attempt to codify laws in Ethiopia date back to the 14th and 15th 
centuries. “Ser‟ate Mengist, the Law of the Monarchy was a short collection that 
contained twenty-one articles of law.  It appears to record a continuous 
legislative activity which started in the 14th century, with King AmdeTsion (r. 
1314-1344) and culminated in the 17th with King Fasiledes (r. 1632-1667).”84 
As Vanderlinden notes this Law mostly deals with religious affairs, but also 
contains texts on civil and penal matters, scattered among attacks against 
heresies of the time.85 According to Aberra “the first codified law of Ethiopia 
was Fewuse Menfessawi (the Spiritual Remedy).86 It was “compiled by 
Ethiopian church scholars by the order of Emperor Za‟ra Ya‟eqob (r. 1434-
1468) and contained 24 articles (principles) from the Old Testament of the 
Bible.”87 
Later, during the rule of the same Emperor, a more elaborate law Fitha 
Negest (Justice of the Kings) that had both secular and religious rules was 
adopted through reception thereby replacing Fewuse Menfessawi.88 The Fitha 
Negest was introduced into Ethiopia from the Coptic Church of Alexandria and 
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was translated from Arabic into Ge‟ez. As Paulos notes it comprises two parts, 
the first based on biblical texts, and the second mainly on Roman-Byzantine 
laws.89  
The Fitha Negest was used as a law in both criminal and civil matters from 
the 16th century onward until the reign of Emperor Haile Sellassie.90 The first 
Penal Code of 1930 stated that it was a „revision‟ of the Fitha Negest updated to 
meet the needs of present times and the revision in 1957 and the Civil Code of 
1960 also makes reference to it, in effect, creating an impression of continued 
legitimacy.91 As Krzeczunowicz observes:  
“the Fitha Negest and other written legal instruments were used in areas 
under the monarchical administration and therefore covered limited areas of 
the country among Christians, and people living in other areas had their cases 
adjudicated and disputes settled through customary institutions.”92  
Thus, much of the pre-modern legal tradition used by the monarchs was 
foreign in inspiration. However, Aberra notes that Emperor Haile Sellassie on 
assuming power, “stated in the preamble of their first decree that the custom of 
each and every locality should be respected and that cases were to be 
adjudicated according to the customary law of the locality”.93 Aberra further 
stated that “at times customary laws, if found useful, could receive the status of 
law and be accepted as atsesir‟at, „the law of the emperors‟, which he translates 
as „presidential jurisprudence‟ used as precedent for future cases”.94  
Ethiopia embarked on a politically motivated modernization of its laws with 
the coming to power of Emperor Haile Selassie I, and the promulgation of the 
first Constitution of 1931 and more emphatically as of 1955 when the 
Constitution was revised.95 As Bahru observes “the 1931 Constitution was 
drafted by Bejirond TekleHawaryat TekleMariam, and was influenced by the 
Japanese Meiji Constitution of 1889, (which in turn was influenced by German 
Constitutions) …”.96 The 1955 revised Constitution of Ethiopia was to a certain 
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extent influenced by “Anglo-American constitutional traditions [and] the 
Westminster Model and the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human rights” 
and also further consolidated imperial powers including as head of the chilot, 
the imperial court.”97 It is to be noted that 1931 and the 1955 constitutions did 
not include a provision related to customary laws.   
From 1957-1965, Ethiopia legislated six modern legal codes in a substantial 
codification project that aimed at modernizing its legal system. These codes 
were largely receptions from codes of laws of continental Europe, and they 
seem to bear little relation to the traditional patterns of life prevailing in the 
country.98 The chief drafter of the Civil Code of 1960, was René David, and the 
receptions of laws and legal principles included continental civil codes notably 
the French, Swiss, Italian and Greek, in addition to which Egyptian, Lebanese, 
and German codes, and for some provisions from Portuguese, Turkish, Iranian 
and Soviet codes were consulted.99  
Although some attempt was made to incorporate certain principles of 
customary law into the modern codes, they aimed at being comprehensive and 
governing all the legal relations in the country without leaving any space for the 
widely-practiced customary mode of dispute settlement.100 This state policy was 
clear notably in 3347 of the Civil Code, which reads: 
Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written or customary 
previously in force concerning matters provided for in this code shall be 
replaced by this code and are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added).101 
The repeal under Article 3347 of the Civil Code aimed not only at customary 
rules that were inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, but it repealed all 
customary rules concerning matters provided for in the Code, whether they are 
consistent with the Civil Code or not. Nor did the Code allow some grace period 
“until the Code could be disseminated – both physically and in content – but 
rather its immediate enforcement was sanctioned, superseding the customary 
laws extant in the various groups of the Ethiopian society”.102 With regard to the 
repeal of the customary practices, the former Vice President of the Federal 
Supreme Court Menbertsehai Taddesse opines that though we Ethiopians claim 
not to have been colonised (except the short lived Italian occupation from 1936 
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to 1941) in actual fact that is not the case. Rather, the repeal provision in Art. 
3347 in the Civil Code is a testimony to the contrary.103    
However, as Krzeczunowicz observes “the drafters of the Code in fact made 
an attempt to include some elements of the customary rules into the Civil Code. 
Some have claimed that the „general‟ custom of the land (its „common law‟) in 
areas of civil matters has been more or less included in the Ethiopian Civil 
Code”.104 What is more, as Abera and Scholler observe “there are in fact certain 
examples of inclusion of the pre-existing customs of the Ethiopian peoples in, 
for example, family matters (concerning betrothal, moral prejudice, kinds of 
marriage, and intestate inheritance), contracts, property law (about the principle 
of usucaption, right of way, and rural servitude), and torts (in fixing the amount 
of fair compensation)”.105 
Alula and Getachew argue that the incorporation cited above cannot be taken 
as a fair and realistic treatment of the customary law in the country for the 
following three reasons. First, “the examples of incorporation could not possibly 
represent the customary laws of all the ethno-national groups of the country.”106 
Secondly, “the incorporation was made in rather limited areas and do not match 
the body of customary laws with a veritable mass of rules in all areas of the civil 
and criminal law.”107 Thirdly, “formal system did not give any place for the 
customary institutions that exist in various sections of the society.”108 
Accordingly, “all courts of judicature were restricted to be the ones that would 
be established by the State to apply the State formulated and codified laws.”109 
As Alula and Getachew observe, “the political motives and justifications” for 
failure to give due attention to “customary law was primarily the belief that 
providing a uniform and modern legal regime would be necessary for the socio-
economic development of the country, and a precondition for effective nation-
building”.110 However, “half a century after the enactment of the modern codes 
and the establishment of a modern judicial system”, the much sought legal 
uniformity has not been achieved, and the modern codes have not been able to 
“successfully supplant customary laws and institutions of dispute settlement”.111 
Rather, “fifty years after the enactment of the Penal Code and the Civil Code 
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which aimed at providing a comprehensive body of law in the criminal and civil 
matters, respectively, customary laws and institutions are still active and vibrant. 
This may indicate that the approaches taken by the modernizers of the Ethiopian 
law might have been wrong, or at least require rethinking and revision”.112 
The Derg period (1974 – 1991) introduced a socialist orientation reflected in 
the 1987 Constitution of the People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), 
drafted by the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities in 1986. It was 
modelled along the lines of Marxist-Leninist constitutions such as the Soviet 
Union.113 Although there was recognition that the Ethiopian state has „from the 
beginning been a multi-national state‟, the Constitution is centralist and the 
PDRE is viewed as a unitary state, which „shall ensure the equality of 
nationalities, combat chauvinism and narrow nationalism and advance the unity 
of the Working People of all nationalities114 with only token concessions to the 
idea of autonomy.115 Despite the Derg‟s attempt to instill secular values, the 
only significant change from the draft to the final text which was debated prior 
to its adoption was a minor concession to religious interests in the removal of 
the monogamy clause.116  Although 1987 Constitution acknowledged equality of 
nationalities, like the emperor‟s previous two constitutions, it did not contain a 
provision that deals with customary laws.  
3.2 Traditional Conflict Resolution in Post-Derg Ethiopia  
After the defeat of the Derg by the Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Front 
(EPRDF) in 1991 the new approach based on ethnic federalism was both radical 
and pioneering.117 As Clapham observes “the principle of self-determination for 
federated regional units was a departure from the formerly highly centralized 
and unitary state which went further than any African state and took ethnicity as 
its fundamental organising principle to a greater extent than almost any state 
worldwide.118  
The approval of the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 
Constitution by the Constitutional Assembly reflects these changes in the 
direction which have a direct bearing on customary dispute resolution and its 
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relation to the formal justice system.119 The shift in paradigm in the Constitution 
with regard to the complex nature of the Ethiopian society and its problems has 
allowed limited space for customary and religious laws and courts existing in 
the country. The Constitution clearly recognizes the jurisdiction of customary 
and religious laws and courts in family and personal matters among the 
disputants that consent to such a jurisdiction. For instance, Article 34(5) reads: 
“this Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to 
personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws, with 
the consent of the parties to the dispute. Particulars shall be determined by law.” 
This implies that the Constitution guarantees an opt-out clause for the parties in 
dispute. Article 78 (5) reads: “Pursuant to Sub-Article 5 of Article 34, the House 
of Peoples‟ Representatives and State Councils can establish or give official 
recognition to religious and customary courts. Religious and customary courts 
that had state recognition and functioned prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution shall be organized on the basis of recognition accorded to them by 
this Constitution.”  
As per Article 78(5) of the FDRE Constitution, the Ethiopian state has three 
ways of giving official status to religious and customary courts. The first is the 
direct establishment of religious and customary courts by the law-making organs 
at the federal and state level. This involves the process of setting up new 
religious and customary justice systems on the basis of long-standing religious 
and customary beliefs. The second is the recognition of religious and customary 
courts, which were functioning as de facto informal justice systems by the 
federal and state legislatures. The third is the automatic recognition of religious 
and customary courts, which were functioning on the basis of official 
recognition before the promulgation of the FDRE Constitution. As Forsyth 
observes both cases of establishment and recognition signify that the state would 
develop standards that need to be observed by the religious and customary 
systems.120  
Articles 34(5) and 78(5) therefore imply that at least in those areas 
mentioned, the Customary Dispute Resolution (CDR) systems can exist 
separately from, and parallel with the state-sponsored legal-judicial system. In 
effect, family law and the law of succession are now potentially within the 
competence of the members states. 
Although these constitutional provisions incorporate customary dispute 
resolution in Ethiopia, “there are also serious risks for individual human rights, 
notably of women, children and minorities that need to be taken into 
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consideration and protected through federal as well as state legislation and legal 
provisions”.121 In this respect, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association has 
played a significant role in its efforts and participation toward the enactment of 
the Revised Family Code in 2000.122 The Revised Family Code has addressed 
the discrimination between men and women in the 1960 Civil Code. The Code 
had different marriage ages for men and women, and it had designated the 
husband as the household head with the right to choose common residence and 
manage common property.123 Likewise, the 1957 Penal Code was revised in 
2004.  The 1957 Penal Code had criminalized abortion, and it did not address or 
criminalize domestic violence, or female genital mutilation.124   
Regarding civil matters other than the issues stated above, the Constitution 
does not specifically prohibit the operation of traditional conflict resolution 
systems. Although this could potentially provide the space for the involvement 
of traditional conflict resolution systems in other legal domains, the fact that 
traditional conflict resolution is mentioned in the contexts of family and 
personal law without reference to other legal areas creates an impression that 
traditional conflict resolution jurisdiction is or should be restricted to family and 
personal law. Under the system of division of the legislative competence among 
federal and state governments in Ethiopia, civil matters (other than those 
specifically mentioned as federal under Art. 55 of the Constitution) fall under 
state jurisdiction.125 One could therefore envisage the possibility for States to 
recognize certain jurisdiction for the traditional conflict resolution systems when 
they enact laws on civil matters. 
With regard to criminal matters, the old philosophy – i.e., the uniformity of 
criminal law and jurisdiction– still continues. Traditional conflict resolution 
systems are not allowed to operate in the criminal law areas even if in actual fact 
they are deeply involved in criminal matters. However, it is to be noted that the 
formal justice system regularly depends on traditional conflict resolution 
institutions to solve less serious cases, to bring criminals to courts, to make sure 
that judgments by traditional conflict resolution institutions are upheld and to 
attain reconciliation after cases are decided. In this regard, the new Federal 
Criminal Justice Policy126 has recognized the possibility of using traditional 
conflict resolution practices and institutions to resolve criminal cases. This 
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implies the importance of clarifying the relationship between state and non-state 
justice systems. Among the main issues that require clarification are the 
mandate and level of oversight of the formal state justice system over the non-
state justice systems and the jurisdiction of the non-state justice systems.   
In Ethiopia, conflicts between the formal, traditional and religious laws 
persist. This is mostly manifested with regard to the status of women and 
criminal law. According to most Ethiopian officials (cited in a 2005 Baseline 
Study Report) “in the current system, where federal law is not forcefully 
implemented, traditional and religious laws are working well”.127 According to 
the officials “people at the grass root level are said to be satisfied with it and do 
not require any change”. All the interviewed officials and former judges 
expressed the strong view that “nothing should be attempted against religious or 
traditional laws at this stage”. Otherwise, “it would most probably be extremely 
counterproductive and fire back on the government”. They emphasized the fact 
that traditional law is deeply entrenched in people‟s minds and has been 
enforced for centuries”. As a result, “[t]he central powers in the past never 
attempted to force and implement effectively central government‟s laws on 
people abiding by customary law”.128  Thus, even if the earlier legal regimes in 
Ethiopia aspired towards social engineering through customary law repeal 
provision and legal transplantation, the failure to recognize legal pluralism was 
inappropriate. This is so because the attempted modernization process did not 
consider the context at the grassroots.  
Conclusion  
In Africa, colonization introduced a cultural conflict between the African and 
western cultures. The western culture was viewed as superior and dominant by 
subjugating African cultures. In a way, cultural hegemony was introduced to the 
world of African conflict resolution. Indigenous African conflict resolutions 
were only allowed to guide courts provided they are not repugnant to justice and 
morality. However, the irony is, repugnancy is to be measured by western sense 
of justice and morality by relegating the African sense of justice and morality.  
In South Africa, broad policy shifts have taken place on the role of traditional 
conflict resolution since the beginning of democratic rule in 1994. The shifts 
show that while government was originally indecisive about traditional conflict 
resolution, it has started to integrate traditional conflict resolution into the 
constitutional system, even if there is a serious challenge from rural people, 
scholars and civil societies. However, in the process of integration (drafting 
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national laws and statutes on traditional conflict resolution), there is a need for 
transparency and public participation (specially, the rural population). 
Traditional leaders who play key role in traditional conflict resolution should 
not be relegated to mere traditional councilors. The integration requires the 
importance of cooperative partnership by engaging all stakeholders including 
the rural community, the house of traditional leaders, the local government and 
upwards in the governance structure. Moreover, there should exist mutual 
respect and a deeper understanding of the administrative tasks of traditional 
leadership. The idea of acknowledging traditional conflict resolution in South 
Africa should be in line with the constitutional principles and rights enshrined in 
the Constitution, and it should not be imposed or forced upon the people living 
under the traditional leadership. 
In Ethiopia, the formal and traditional justice systems present a multifaceted 
network of laws and institutions that make up the national legal system. With 
regard to the formal justice system of governance, the state justice system is 
made up of laws and institutions at the federal and regional state levels. The 
traditional justice systems are made up of religious and customary justice 
systems. In order to accommodate diversity and pluralism, the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution recognizes a limited application 
of religious and customary conflict resolution systems in personal and family 
matters with the consent of the parties involved in a conflict. However, even if 
the FDRE Constitution contains provisions on customary laws, it does not 
clearly specify the relationship between customary and formal legal system.   
Traditional conflict resolution systems are extensively employed by the 
people in the settlement of various kinds of conflict. The Constitutional space 
for traditional dispute resolution is still limited in Ethiopia, and it has not been 
followed through with practical provisions and enabling environment. Even if 
Ethiopia has not been colonized, indirect colonization could be demonstrated by 
critically examining the magnitude and impact of the modern codification 
process in the country.   
In both South Africa and Ethiopia, the central governments indeed recognize 
the importance of traditional conflict resolution. However, they should go 
beyond pledges of recognizing traditional conflict resolution systems by taking 
positive steps to allocate the required power and provide new authority for 
traditional conflict resolution.                                                                       ■ 
 
